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ODVOJENOST ŠERIJATSKOG PRAVA OD DRŽAVE
KAO IZVOR PROSTORA PROMJENJIVOSTI:
UČINcI I GRANIcE
U suvremenim ustavnim demokracijama primjena vjerskog prava u određenim 
je granicama prepuštena pojedinačnom vjerniku te se država u to obično 
neće miješati. U ovome radu autor analizira taj uobičajeni odgovor na 
vjerske norme u kontekstu rastuće prisutnosti šerijatskog prava u Kanadi 
i Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu. Utvrđuje se da on pojedinačnim vjernicima pre-
pušta mogućnost da sami određuju kako će se i u kojoj mjeri vjersko pravo 
na njih primjenjivati. To nazivamo prostorom promjenjivosti. Na njegova 
ograničenja već ukazuje niz autora. Posebno se ističe problem pretjerane 
izloženosti pojedinca neumoljivoj vjerskoj tradiciji. Mi napominjemo da u 
potrazi za valjanim rješenjima tih i drugih problema treba imati na umu da 
odvojenost države i vjerskog prava te prostor promjenjivosti što iz nje proizlazi 
nisu prepreka različitostima, već njihova podloga. Zanemarivanje toga može 
dovesti do dodatnih poteškoća u uvijek napetom odnosu vlasti i religije. 
Ključne riječi: vjerske slobode, šerijatsko pravo, sekularna država.
1. INTRODUcTION
Muslim law (Sharia) has made its presence known across the globe. Its 
rules on family life have been particularly controversial. The flows of migration 
have carried them to the liberal democracies of the West, where a number of 
groups requested that they be recognised or accommodated. Most commonly, it is 
*  All web resources referred to in this paper were last accessed on 27 September 2013.
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suggested that family law arbitration under Sharia be allowed and that the resulting 
awards be granted some degree of civil effect. In other words, it is requested that 
the secular law outlines a space in which religious law would be free to flourish 
and regulate the lives of devout Muslims, at the same time strongly interacting with 
the national legal system. At the time of writing, such requests for accommodation 
have been resolutely rejected in Canada,1 Australia,2 Germany,3 US4 and, to some 
extent, the UK.5 Thus, it would seem that a widespread response to the spreading of 
Sharia family law in the West has been to keep it separate from the state, rather than 
accommodate its peculiarities.
The academic debate on these issues has for the most part followed the 
dichotomy described above. Some argue for strict separation, claiming that all 
civil effect should be denied to Sharia’s family law norms, most commonly on the 
grounds of their plain incompatibility with the public order of a liberal constitutional 
democracy.6 Sharia, it is convincingly argued, endangers human rights guarantees, 
particularly gender equality, and the coherence of the legal order, threatening 
to introduce a fatal form of legal pluralism.7 On the other side is a much smaller 
1  Sturcke, J., Sharia law in Canada, almost, <http://www.theguardian.com>, 8 February 2008, 
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2008/feb/08/sharialawincanadaalmost.
2  Merritt, C., Sharia Law at Work in Australia, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au>, 20 July 
2011, available at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/sharia-law-at-work-in-
australia/story-fn59niix-1226097889992.
3  Sharia in Germany? Politician Blasted for Support of Islamic Law, <http://www.spiegel.
de>, 3 February 2012, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/sharia-in-
germany-politician-blasted-for-support-of-islamic-law-a-813148.html.
4  Kaleem, J., Sharia Law Campaign Begins As Muslim Group Fights Bans, <http://www.
huffingtonpost.com>, 1 March 2012, available at: http://huff.to/zwCYCC.
5  Bingham, J., Sharia courts „as consensual as rape“, the House of Lords told, <http://www.
thetelegraph.co.uk>, 20 October 2012, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
religion/9621319/Sharia-courts-as-consensual-as-rape-House-of-Lords-told.html.
6  See, for example, Gaudreault-DesBiens, J., Religious Courts, Personal Federalism, and 
Legal Transplants, in Shari’a in the West, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 171; 
Buchler, A., Islamic Family Law in Europe? From Dichotomies to Discourse - or: Beyond 
Cultural and Religious Identity in Family Law, International Journal of Law in Context 8, 
no. 2 (2012), p. 204; Fretwell Wilson, R., Privatizing Family Law in the Name of Religion, 
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 18 (May 2010): p. 925; Report: “When Legal Worlds 
Overlap: Human Rights, State and Non-State Law, Versoix, Switzerland: The International 
Council on Human Rights Policy, 2009; Reiss, M., The Materialization of Legal Pluralism 
in Britain: Why Shari’a Council Decisions Should Be Non-Binding, Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 26 (2009): pp. 739–778.
7  Legal pluralism can be defined “as the condition in which a population observes more 
than one law” (Woodman, G. R., The Possibilities of Co-existence of Religious Laws 
with Other Laws, in Law and Religion in Multicultural Societies, Copenhagen, Djøf 
Publishing Copenhagen, 2008, p 26.) For the purposes of this paper, I include religious laws 
encompassed by Sharia into other laws that may be observed by the population, and as such 
compete with the power of the secular government, even when they can be applied only 
without governmental sanction. For an introductory discussion on legal pluralism, see the 
work of John Griffiths. (Griffiths, J., What Is Legal Pluralism?, Journal of Legal Pluralism 
24, no. 1 [1986]: pp. 1–55).
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but nonetheless vocal group of scholars, who argue that it is a mistake to simply 
separate Sharia from the state.8 Their claim is that accommodating Sharia may 
provide a range of benefits. Most notably, it is cogently argued that accommodation 
can facilitate pluralism in a constitutional democracy, enabling better integration 
of religious minorities and help eradicating problematic religious or traditional 
practices, such as child marriages. In this sense, it is concluded that some degree of 
accommodation is more protective of human rights and the liberal legal order than 
pure separation.
While both strands of jurisprudence make valuable contributions to the 
debate on Sharia in the West, they also contain blind spots. The advocates of 
separation are most zealous in requiring that Sharia remains separate from the 
state, treating separation as a barrier to stop an infestation, but little is said of its 
limitations and predicted effects.9 On the other side lie those who suggest that a 
form of accommodation be introduced. Much like their opponents, however, 
scholars representing this position seem to view separation and accommodation as 
polar opposites. Where one is increased, the other is to be ignored or decreased. 
Consequently, their suggestions do not pay sufficient regard to the need to maintain 
separation between the state and Sharia. 
 The goal of this paper is to look past the described division between 
“separation” and “accommodation” as two mutually exclusive positions. Instead, 
it is argued that separation itself is a form of accommodation. Contrary to the 
claims of accommodationists, it too causes the state to engage with Sharia family 
law norms. Unlike accommodation requests made by different religious groups, 
however, its purpose is not to support the traditions upheld by communities of 
believers. Instead, it is meant to empower and accommodate the religious freedom 
of individual believer so that she may choose between the religious and secular 
laws, using both as she negotiates and constructs her identity, not as a citizen or 
as a believer, but both. This is achieved by the “transformative space” projected by 
Sharia’s separation from the state. 
Nonetheless, the space has its limitations. It does not fully protect the interests 
of the individual citizen. Hence, limitations of the separation between the state 
and Sharia in this sense should be examined and alleviated. However, any such 
measure should not consider only the interests of those that need to be protected, 
8  Shachar, A., Religion, State and the Problem of Gender: New Modes of Citizenship and 
Governance in Diverse Societies, McGill Law Journal 50 (2005): pp. 49 – 88; Shachar, 
A., Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9, no. 2 (July 2008), pp. 573-607; Ahmed, F. And Luk, S., 
How Religious Arbitration Could Enhance Personal Autonomy, Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 1(2) (2012): pp. 424–445; Kutty, F., The Myth and Reality of Shari’a Courts in 
Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for the Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, University 
of St. Thomas Law Journal 7, no. 3: June 2011., p. 1.
9  Christoffersen, L., Is Shari’a Law, Religion or a Combination? European Legal Discourses 
on Shari’a, in Shari’a as Discourse: Legal Traditions and Encounter with Europe (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2010), p. 73
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but also the need to maintain the vitality of the transformative space. The agency 
of individual believers can then be properly advanced. By contrast, efforts to create 
state-sanctioned shortcuts to seemingly desirable goals may significantly erode its 
potency. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the first part, I look at the basic features of 
the relationship between state and religious law as moderated by separation (1). In 
the second part, I look at the two models of Sharia’s separation from the state that 
have developed thus far (2). In the third part, I explain the “transformative space” 
that is developed by virtue of these models (3). The last part of the paper covers the 
limitations of separation and the attempts to alleviate them from the perspective of 
its transformative space (4). 
2. STATE, RELIGIOUS LAW AND THEIR SEPARATION: AN 
OUTLINE
Generally speaking, separation of the religious and the governmental generated 
a common secular space as the “lowest common denominator” that was to unite 
the population despite religious differences.10 Therefore, religious conviction as a 
transcendental concept was not to have anything to do with the reason-based state. 
Instead, religion was to be removed from the powers the government has over the 
public sphere.11 This was done against the background of abuse that emerged every 
time religion and the government uncontrollably joined forces. These range from 
the most extreme cases of persecution12 and discrimination13 to the seemingly mild 
endorsements of a single religion or a number of creeds which nonetheless wear 
away the principle of equality.14 The one common feature of all these abuses is that 
they to some extent inevitably erode the individual freedom to choose and practice 
their belief, whether alone or in community with others. 
Separation seeks to avoid the erosion of liberty by relegating religion into 
privacy, leaving each believer with the ability to adopt, practice and change any 
10  Raday, F., Secular Constitutionalism Vindicated, Cardozo Law Review 30, no. 6 (2006): 
2770; Mahmood, S., Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic 
Reformation, Public Culture 18, no. 2 (2006): p. 524.
11  Rosenfeld, M., Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological 
Pluralism, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 6, No. 3 & 4 (October 2008): p. 
415.
12  The example of the immediate post-establishment period in England being the case in point. 
(Rivers, J., The Law of Organized Religions, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 10.)
13  Grim, B. J. and Finke, R., The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict 
in the Twenty-First Century, 1st ed., New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 40.
14  For a convincing investigation of this argument from the international law perspective, see 
Temperman, J., State-Religion Relationships and Human Rights Law, Leiden, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2010, p. 165.
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beliefs she might have and to form communities with others accordingly.15 In this 
sense, separation accommodates the conscience of individuals and, by extension, 
the integrity of religious communities. The state, restrained by the mandates 
of separation, has to turn back from religion and cease using it as a political 
playground. Even though particular religious communities may vie for political 
power, the state has to deny any hope of fulfilling such temptations.16 The more 
the government can avoid undue aggression or support to any particular religion, 
the safer from unnecessary governmental interference will religious identity of all 
become. 
The task of this part of the paper is to look at the way this general logic of 
separation translates into the relationship of the state with religious law. In this 
regard, we might be tempted to conclude that the existence of separation requires 
that religious law be deprived of all civil effect. After all, as Temperman puts it, 
should the state become “the enforcer and guardian” of religious law, the legal 
system would be disrupted on several fronts. Most notably, the rights of individuals 
would be endangered by religious rules which may run contrary to them. 
Furthermore, a variety of systematic violations would take place, such as inequality 
before the law on the basis of religious belonging.17 One possible scenario would 
then be that one law applies to Christians, another to Muslims, while national law 
retains jurisdiction over those without religious affiliation.  
Hence, it can be concluded that believers may observe the tenets of their creed 
or refuse to do so but they should not expect the state to have anything to say about 
it. However, while religious freedom in itself does not give anyone the right to have 
the effects of religious laws sanctioned by civil law,18 separation is not necessarily 
opposed to the state making such concessions.19 For example, the state may decide 
to award religious marriages with civil effect. 
In order for these and other possible allowances to be made, separation only 
requires that a proper procedure is in place, one that will avoid extremes in the 
15  In some jurisdictions however, a movement away from this fundamental understanding of 
separation has been observed. For instance, the original French approach to religion, laïcité, 
moved from the understanding of separation as a restraint on the state and is increasingly 
becoming a restraint on the believer by strongly limiting the presence of religion in the public 
space. (See, Daly, E., Public Funding of Religions in French Law: The Role of the Council 
of State in the Politics of Constitutional Secularism, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 
[August 23, 2013], doi:10.1093/ojlr/rwt039, p. 2).
16  As Sajó demonstrates, however, historical arrangements with a particular religion may make 
the state more vulnerable to its demands, thereby diminishing its objectivity when it comes to 
religious matters. (Sajó, A., Constitutionalism and Secularism: The Need for Public Reason, 
Cardozo Law Review 30, no. 6 [June 30, 2009]: p. 2413).
17  Temperman, J., op. cit., p. 172.
18  See, for example, Savez Crkava “Riječ Života” and Others V. Croatia (app. No. 7798/08), 
para. 56. 
19  As a result, the state has at its disposal considerable discretion in deciding which religious 
legal system it will privilege and in what manner. The resulting negative impact on separation 
from religion and the secular nature of the state itself will not be thoroughly discussed in this 
paper as it is a complex topic that has to be dealt with in a separate piece.
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state’s relationship with religion.20 This procedure can be conceived in two tiers. In 
the first one, the state should determine which matters may be accommodated. For 
the second tier, the state should establish criteria that allow it to impartially decide 
whether accommodation can be made in a concrete case. 
As for outlining the subject matters in which accommodation of religious 
law may be considered, the governing consideration is the fundamental nucleus 
of a legal system which the state must safeguard. It includes particular core values 
and minimal moral thresholds, such as gender equality and the child’s best interest. 
The use of religious law may not be sanctioned by the state in a way which allows 
individuals to insulate themselves from these and other similar requirements and 
thereby erode the very heart of a national legal order. For this reason, certain 
branches of law will be completely withheld by the state, such as issues falling 
within the purview of the criminal law. More discretion may be exercised when 
it comes to contracts, property and particular issues concerning family law. For 
instance, domestic violence may not be considered as an application of religious 
rules that may be accommodated by the state.21 By contrast, the choice of a marriage 
ceremony should be left to individual believers insofar as it does not endanger 
the already mentioned fundamentals of a legal order. Thus, a marriage ceremony 
conducted over the telephone with a mentally disabled spouse may not be condoned 
by the state, even though it may be perfectly valid under Sharia.22 But if the state 
is requested to award civil effect to a religious ceremony conducted in a way and 
between individuals who could have otherwise married under civil law, there is 
little reason to refuse.
One of the main obstacles the state should navigate around at this stage is 
the propensity to extend the requirements of the legal order’s core to issues that 
are objectively irrelevant. This is particularly likely to occur if the state adopts an 
ideology as its basis for regulating religious issues or favours only certain religions 
because of their traditional presence in a society.23 In said cases, the state may end 
20  The greatest extremes being either a more or less violent purge of those supporting religious 
law or, on the other side of the spectrum, a full fusion of religious and secular laws or a 
complete replacement of the secular legal system with its religious counterpart (see for 
instance, the controversial decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Refah Partisi 
and Others V. Turkey (app. nos. 41340/98, 41342/98 and 41344/98); Refah Partisi (the 
Welfare Party) and Others V. Turkey [GC] (app. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 
41344/98).
21  Accordingly, the Italian Supreme Court refused the cultural defence of a father who claimed 
he had a right to discipline his daughter for not memorising the Quran. (Supreme Court 
Sentences non-Italian Father for Child Abuse, Ansa.it, March 30, 2012, http://www.ansa.it/
web/notizie/rubriche/english/2012/03/30/visualizza_new.html_158869129.html.)
22  KC and NNC v City of Westminster Social and Community Services Department, [2008] 
EWCA Civ 198. 
23  See supra, footnote 16; Matija Miloš, Problem kompatibilnosti sekularne države i vjerskih 
sloboda: ishodišta i prilog rješenju [Compatibility of the secular state and religious freedom: 
causes and a contribution towards resolution], Hrvatska pravna revija, July/August 2013, pp 
1-10
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up diminishing separation, which should be avoided as much as possible as it may 
unnecessarily single out small or novel religious groups and may endanger the 
freedom of individuals in the process. 
Similar perils should be avoided by the state as it addresses the second tier 
of the process leading up to granting civil effect to religious law. In it, the state 
or, most commonly, its judiciary, has to decide whether individual cases meet the 
requirements set in the first stage. In the example of a religious marriage, the state 
ought to put in place procedures to determine that each of those marriages meets 
the fundamental requirements of the national law. It should not merely rubberstamp 
every religious marriage.24 However, it should also refrain from analysing religious 
marriages in a way that unjustifiably delves into issues of religious doctrine and 
beliefs.25 
If the state moves into either of the mentioned extremes, separation is to some 
extent annulled. In the first case, religious law is effectively fused with the national 
law, as anything it provides will be approved by the state. In the other case, the state 
can become a de facto religious authority, aggressively directing the development of 
religious matters. In avoiding both of these situations, the state should restrict itself 
to the role of a “translator”.26 For instance, if two parties have agreed to settle their 
dispute before a religious authority, and this agreement contains all an acceptable 
secular accord usually would, the state ought to have mechanisms that translate 
the will of the parties to civil law terms.27 A state will thus decide in line with the 
agreement of the parties, but will not be apprehensive or welcoming towards it 
merely because its terms have not been inspired by a secular practice or Christian 
culture, but by “principles of the Glorious Shari’a”.28 In this manner, civil effect is 
24  Nota V. Nota, [1984] Fam Law 310. (the Court notes that the plaintiff, a Sikh, should 
completely submit herself to her religious traditions in the whole: “She is a Sikh and they 
have come to this country and settled here... The Sikhs are very proud of their culture, not 
surprisingly, and it is good that they want to retain it in this country. But if they wish to retain 
their culture they must do so in total.” [paragraph 16])
25  Siahbazi V. Rastegar, 2012 ONSC 2384 (judge identifying an otherwise valid Sharia 
premarital contract with stoning in Afghanistan); V.B. V. Cairns Et Al, (2003) 65 O.R. (3d) 
343 (the court noting that the Bible allows religious alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
only in the case of a minor offense, such as theft); Uddin V. Choudhury, EWCA (Civ) 1205 
(2009) (the court reinterprets Sharia’s rules on dowries and gifts by relying on a religious 
expert different to the one the parties consulted instead of comparing their accord with the 
requirements of the national legal system)
26  András Sajó, Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional Secularism, International Journal 
for Constitutional Law, Vol. 6, No. 3 & 4 (October 2008), p. 626.
27  It is possible that the translation will be feasible only in part. The rest of the religious message 
then inevitably gets lost in the translation as only a part of it is transferred to the language 
of the civil law. For example, in paragraph 11 of the case Uddin V. Choudhury, already 
referenced in footnote 25, the Court established that the parties were married under English 
law only regarding the dowry and gifts received by the bride. Their marriage, however, was 
not recognised outside these narrow limits because a proper ceremony with a civil effect was 
not conducted. 
28  Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximico Pharmaceuticals Ltd and others, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 
1784 (overturning the courts below; they refused to interpret a contract merely because it 
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granted to religious law if and to the extent it meets the terms of the secular law, 
which ensures that the separation between them is not diminished. 
In sum, separation of religious law and the state allows for a number of 
alternatives. On the one hand, religious law may be deprived of all civil effect. 
On the other hand, civil effect may be granted in particular cases provided that 
the national law maintains its authority and establishes procedures that protect 
separation and the national legal order itself from erosion. In any case, the believers 
may always submit themselves to a religious rule or abstain from it as a matter of 
their own personal conviction. If no laws are violated in the process, the state will in 
principle not interfere. However, as will become evident from discussing the models 
which employ the principles expounded here in relation to Sharia, separation’s 
approach to religious law is in no way free from significant difficulties.
3. ACCOMMODATING SHARIA FAMILY LAW THROUGH 
SEPARATION: TWO MODELS
Having covered the basic features of separation between religious law and the 
state, I next look at how these fundamental characteristics figure in the relationship 
between Sharia and the government. This part of the paper looks at two models that 
developed thus far, the Canadian top-down (2.1) and the British bottom-up (2.2) 
approach to Sharia.29 The first one deprives religious law of civil effect, although 
not completely, while the other one is more open to sanctioning religious family 
mandates under civil law.
3.1. canada: top-down separation
In Canada, the debate on the position of Sharia took off when a group of 
Muslims made public their intentions to establish a tribunal that would apply Sharia 
to the members of their community. The plan was to have it in the province of 
Ontario, where legislation on alternative dispute resolution left open the possibility 
to arbitrate family law disputes under religious law. The very idea caused a furore 
that swept across the country, including Quebec, where no family law arbitration was 
referenced “the principles of the Glorious Shari’a”, although the contract could have been 
translated to secular terms without involving any religious issues); Ali v. Ali (2000), case 
unreported but described in Menski, W., “Immigration and Multiculturalism in Britain: New 
Issues in Research and Policy,”, KIAPS: Bulletin of Asia-Pacific studies, vol XII/2002, p. 
5 (a British judge refuses to award the sum of money the bride was supposed to receive 
according to Sharia, instead he changes the amount to be paid by one pound without any 
proper justification)
29  For a theoretical background of the difference between the top-down and bottom-up models 
as employed in this paper, see Schuck, P. H., The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic 
Governance, Boulder, Westview Press, 2000, pp. 419–455.
1081
M. MILOŠ, Separation of Sharia from the State as Accommodation – Effects...
Zb. Prav. fak. Sveuč. Rij. (1991) v. 34, br. 2, 1073-1108 (2013) 
ever allowed.30 The central cause of the tumult was the fear that institutionalizing 
arbitration would give obscure religious groups a chance to introduce patriarchal 
traditions into the Canadian society. It was feared that, under the cover provided by 
arbitration’s private nature, a number of abuses would be perpetuated. As Sharia’s 
rules on a variety of areas, such as getting married,31 marital life,32 inheritance,33 
divorce34 and child custody35 may be less protective for women than the national 
law, the chief concern was that the ever fragile gender equality would be brought to 
naught. Women would be forced to stay in abusive relationships,36 the assimilation 
of immigrants to the Canadian society would be made harder and there would 
be inequality before the law. Thus, it was argued that there should be only one, 
Canadian law, and that it should apply to all.
The Ontarian government first attempted to address the concerns raised by 
investigating how religious arbitration operates in practice. Marion Boyd, the former 
Attorney General, was commissioned to draw up a report on the matter. She did 
not find many problems with religious law being applied in the arbitration setting, 
possibly because the private nature of arbitration made a more comprehensive 
research harder.37 Nonetheless, Boyd recommended that religious arbitration be kept 
as long as additional safeguards are provided in order to protect more vulnerable 
parties, particularly women.38 However, the permissive tone and argument of her 
report hardly appeased the objectors to religious arbitration.
30  Bakht, N., Were Muslim Barbarians Really Knocking On the Gates of Ontario?: The 
Religious Arbitration Controversy - Another Perspective, Ottawa Law Review, 40th 
Anniversary (Summer 2005): p. 19.
31  Fournier, P., In the (Canadian) Shadow of Islamic Law: Translating Mahr as a Bargaining 
Endowment, in Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada, UBC Press, 2008, pp. 140–160.
32  Sechzer, J. A., Islam and Women: Where Tradition Meets Modernity: History and 
Interpretations of Islamic Women’s Status, Sex Roles 51, no. 5/6 (September 2004), p. 270.
33  For a detailed overview on Sharia provisions on inheritance, including the views of different 
schools of interpretation, see Hallaq, W. B., Sharia Between Past and Present: Theory, 
Practice and Transformations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 289–295.
34  It is known that under Sharia the husband can grant the divorce with more ease than the wife. 
The original reasoning behind this difference was twofold. On the one hand, since the man 
was traditionally the provider, he was considered to have the right to a privileged treatment 
and, on the other, the woman was considered to be too emotionally unstable to deserve the 
same right. (Emon, A., Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic Politics, Jurisprudence, and 
Multicultural Accommodation, University of Toronto Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
947149, 2006., available at: http://bit.ly/T2CFu5, p. 7).
35  For a detailed discussion on the matter, see Hallaq, op. cit., pp. 287–289.
36  Fretwell Wilson, R., op. cit., after footnote 38 (commenting on a case of a British Muslim 
who was made to “reconcile” with her abusive husband).
37  Weinrib, L. E., Speech, Religion, and the Traditional Family, in Censorial Sensitivities: Free 
Speech and Religion in a Fundamentalist World, Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 
2007, p. 182.
38  For more detail on Marion Boyd’s concrete recommendations, see Boyd, M., Executive 
Summary of the Report Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting 
Inclusion, Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, December 2004, available at: http://bit.
ly/JRyQWY.
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Indeed, there were powerful reasons militating against adopting the findings 
of the Boyd report in practice. First of all, the debate over the place of Sharia was 
highly polarized, in no small part because of Sharia’s advocates, who implied that 
applying religious law should exclude the application of Canadian law.39 Such a 
direct claim of not just interference, but of primacy of religious over the secular 
could have only resulted in an equally resolute retort of the government, reaffirming 
the dominance of the national law.40 The room for a more nuanced discussion was 
thus most probably hard, if not impossible to maintain. The second important 
circumstance was Canada’s multicultural nature.41 Its policies tend towards 
inclusion, rather than separation and particularisation of different social groups.42 
For this reason, the very idea of introducing measures that might single out a group 
on the basis of religion was likely to have been suspicious at the outset.
Therefore, the Ontarian government decided to maintain separation between 
Sharia and itself by way of the Family Statute Law Amendment Act of 2006. 
Specifically, all family law alternative dispute resolution conducted under any law 
other than the one of “Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction” were not to be 
considered arbitration in the first place and were deprived of any civil effect.43
 This general rejection of religious family law is the central feature of the top-
down approach. The government puts in place a unified standard by determining 
that no religious family law arbitration is permitted and religious communities, 
Muslims included, are thereby expected to keep the respective part of their religious 
identity and practice private. Therefore, Sharia is not uplifted to the level of the 
national law, nor is it given any lesser level of recognition by the government.44 
39  Shachar, A., Religion..., cit., para. 19; Bambach, L. A., The Enforceability of Arbitration 
Decisions Made By Muslim Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, Journal 
of Law and Religion 25 (2010): p. 411.
40  Ministry of the Attorney General, McGuinty Government Declares One Law for All 
Ontarians: Only Canadian Law to Apply to Family Law Arbitrations, Ontario.ca, 15 
November 2005, available at: http://news.ontario.ca/archive/en/2005/11/15/McGuinty-
Government-Declares-One-Law-For-All-Ontarians.html. 
41  Section 27 of the Canadian Charter provides that the Charter “shall be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians“. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.)
42  Bhabha, F., Between Exclusion and Assimilation: Experimentalizing Multiculturalism, 
McGill Law Journal 54 (2009), p. 53.
43  ‘An Act to amend the Arbitration Act, 1991, the Child and Family Services Act and the 
Family Law Act in connection with family arbitration and related matters, and to amend the 
Children’s Law Reform act in connection with the matters to be considered by the court in 
dealing with applications for custody and access’, February 23, 2006. Specifically, its section 
2.2 provided that “(1) When a decision about a matter described in clause (a) of the definition 
of “family arbitration” in section 1 is made by a third person in a process that is not conducted 
exclusively in accordance with the law of Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction, (a) the 
process is not a family arbitration; and (b) the decision is not a family arbitration award and 
has no legal effect.”
44  Note that some channels through which religious family law may acquire civil effect were 
left open. These include domestic contracts and allow the state more oversight. (Amien, W., 
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Legal pluralism cannot formally compete with the national law and thereby create 
divisions on the grounds of religion. 
However, legal pluralism cannot be wished away. While the state may 
refuse to grant it civil effect, it remains a social fact. As such, religious family law 
continues its existence and can still play a substantial role in the life of Muslims. It 
can be applied in private, much as any other religious practice could be.45 Naturally, 
establishing a religious tribunal in a garage or a living room is in itself not a problem 
as long as the individual believer has a chance to voluntarily define and agree to its 
terms. However, should a believer be forced into religious dispute resolution by the 
pressures of a tightly knit religious community or a traditional family, there is little 
to protect her. The likelihood of this scenario occurring was, after all, one of the key 
arguments against allowing Sharia arbitration to continue.46 Nonetheless, it seems 
separation as applied in Canada only pushes the possible abuse into privacy, but 
does not tackle it. Instead, it is expected that the informal tribunals still operating 
in particular communities take a hint and ensure their workings are in line with 
requirements of the national law.47 The individual believer, on the other hand, is 
supposed to abandon those applications of religious law which she finds particularly 
injurious and unacceptable. As a matter of fact, even if a religious tribunal violates 
criminal law norms, the believer whose interests are being harmed may still be 
expected to “exit” by turning to the authorities. If she is not able to do so, the 
consequences may be dire.48 Even so, no other proper protection is offered by the 
top-down approach.
In conclusion, the Canadian example demonstrates one way to separate Sharia 
from the state. The specifics of the solution applied in Ontario reveal a blanket, 
Muslim Private Laws (MPL) in Canada: A Case Study Considering the Conflict Between 
Freedom of Religion and Muslim Women’s Right to Equality, in Conflicts Between 
Fundamental Rights, Oxford, Intersentia, 2008, p. 403.)
45  This, in fact, is precisely what is going on in Canada. (Rohe, M., The Current Debate on 
Islam, in Law and Religion in the 21st Century: Relations Between States and Religious 
Communities, Surrey, Ashgate, 2010, p. 338).
46  Bakht, N., Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario’s Arbitration Act and Its 
Impact on Women, Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 1, no. 1 (2004), p. 9.
47  The argument may be seen as problematic on account of its formalistic nature. Namely, it 
could be argued that it does not fully take into account the nature of human identity. Bhamra 
argues that human beings do not take their identity to mean just those segments of their 
personality that are necessarily pleasant and empowering. On the contrary, even agency-
depriving factors are appreciated as much as those that are “positive” (Bhamra, M. K., The 
Challenges of Justice in Diverse Societies: Constitutionalism and Pluralism, Surrey, Ashgate, 
2011, p. 26). A Muslim woman can, for instance, be as attached to a patriarchal interpretation 
of Sharia as she can to a progressive one. A simple external ban does little, if anything to 
change this self-understanding. Consequently, since a religious community does consist of 
human beings who may carry such attachments, there is some reason to doubt that a ban 
would change anything. At the end of the day, it may be perceived as a reason to react against 
the government even more and intensify the attachment with the traditional. 
48  Reese, F., Family Found Guilty in Honor Murder Case, Yahoo! Voices, January 30, 2012, 
available at: http://yhoo.it/xUFAwe.
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top-down stripping of civil effect directed at religious law norms. It leaves the 
believers with a choice between the national and religious norms. However, the 
possible effect of strong traditional communities to which they belong is not dealt 
with appropriately. Therefore, while it is undoubtable that the Canadian approach 
upholds separation, it does have some pronounced weaknesses. Interestingly, the 
United Kingdom replicates the same problem despite its different approach to 
Sharia.
3.2. UK: bottom-up separation
The UK deals with the separation of Sharia from the state through the 
“bottom-up” approach. Briefly put, it is a reflection of British pragmatism.49 Should 
the legal system notice a particular disconcerting practice, it will be prohibited, but 
only when experience shows that it is problematic. Whether Sharia is generally 
oppressive or not is not an issue the government is very likely to tackle, unless 
practical necessity dictates otherwise.50 In essence, approaching Sharia in such a 
manner means applying the social laboratory philosophy, where the best solution is 
sought by incremental tinkering with Sharia in practice. For this reason and unlike 
its Canadian counterpart, the bottom-up model is more open to granting civil effect 
to religious law.
Because of the seemingly permissive nature of the British approach, some 
would argue that it is not in fact a case of separation between Sharia and the 
state. In particular, Zucca proposes that it is instead a form of special engagement 
between the two, where the secular law strives to “learn more” about Sharia.51 
However, as was argued earlier, separation of the religious and the governmental 
is not necessarily a relationship where the latter ignores the religious or deprives it 
of its public presence. Particularly as far as religious law is concerned, separation 
is maintained for as long as the state draws into its decisions facts required for 
it to perform its tasks, irrespective of their religious context or significance. If 
this condition is met, civil effect may be granted to religious norms without 
compromising their separation from the state.
49  McCrudden, C., Multiculturalism, Freedom of Religion, Equality, and the British Constitution: 
The JFS Case Considered, International Journal of Constitutional Law 9, no. 1 (2011), p. 7.
50  Em (Lebanon) (Fc) (Appellant) (Fc) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Appellate 
Committee, [2008] UKHL 64 (2008) (Sharia child custody norms are incompatible with 
the British legal order, but Sharia in itself is not characterised in any way); KC and NNC v 
City of Westminster Social and Community Services Department, [2008] EWCA Civ 198 
(marriage invalid due to disability, the involvement of Sharia was not criticised, nor the fact 
that it sanctions marriages concluded over the telephone).
51  See Zucca, L., What Is the Place of Sharia Law in European Legal Systems?, in A Secular 
Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128049.
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That this is the way the British system operates may be seen from the recent 
decision of the High Court of Justice in AI v. MT.52 In this case, a devout Jewish 
couple married both under civil law and the law of their religion, Halacha. After 
seven years of married life which resulted in two children, the couple decided to end 
their relationship. Their intention was to settle matters before a religious authority, 
the Beth Din in New York and then have the resulting agreement recognised in the 
UK. Following several developments of no immediate concern for this paper, the 
couple managed to agree on the terms of their divorce before the already mentioned 
Jewish authority. This included relevant financial arrangements and child custody 
plans. The High Court of Justice then gave the resulting agreement civil effect.
The Court’s approach is of great interest for this paper, as it conclusively 
demonstrates that the British system is in fact a form of separation. Most obviously, 
the Court did not base its decision on religious law, but is grounding it in national 
law. The ruling of the Beth Din was treated as a source of relevant facts that 
weighed strongly on the Court’s opinion. However, it was in no way binding for 
it or the parties. Secondly, the High Court noted expressly that whether religious 
law can be transposed into secular terms is to be decided on a case-by-case basis, 
with the secular law retaining its supremacy at all times.53 Were the British approach 
not a form of separation, the Court would either dismiss or affirm the decision of 
the religious authority, possibly providing its own interpretation of religious law. 
Were it a system of “learning”, as Zucca asserts, the judiciary would surely master 
all relevant information about Halacha by now, as the application of the Jewish 
legal system is far more common and less controversial than Sharia.54 It would not 
scrutinise the Betai Din as the High Court of Justice did. As this is not the case, it 
can only be concluded that the UK retains the separation between the religious and 
the secular law, albeit in a more flexible form.
Much like the top-down approach, this supple, experience-based application 
of separation has positive and negative sides. The most obvious positive feature 
is that it avoids condemning Sharia as necessarily oppressive at the outset. This 
does not needlessly antagonise the proponents of this religious law system. More 
importantly, unlike the Canadian approach, the British system transfers the control 
over the position of Sharia in society over to Muslims. It is the way they apply 
Sharia that will ultimately determine whether the government will remain more 
flexible or move in and deprive religious norms of any possibility of a civil effect. 
By this token, religious communities are encouraged to avoid forcing extremist 
interpretations of religious norms unto their members.
52  AI v. MT, [2013] EWHC 100 (Fam).
53  Ibid., paras. 27, 29.
54  Bambach, L. A., op. cit., p. 380; Witte Jr., J. and Nichols, J. A., Faith-based Family Laws 
in Western Democracies?, Fides et Libertas: The Journal of International Religious Liberty 
Association; U of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-09; Emory Public Law 
Research Paper No. 11-160; Available at SSRN: Http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805304 (2010): p. 
131.
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This incremental approach could be said to have been achievable precisely 
because the British Muslim population is for the most part not making particularly 
strong claims for a greater recognition of Sharia.55 The reasons for such a different 
attitude towards the national legal system are manifold. For one, Muslim religious 
norms are perceived as an intimate matter, as such wholly disassociated from the 
state.56 In reality, the latter is sometimes seen as the product of a corrupt and fallen 
society, Sharia becoming the “ethical reservoir” in a barren desert.57 Additionally, 
Muslims have over time developed a hybrid law of their own (i.e. angrezi shariat), 
which combines religious norms with the openings left in the secular law.58 Finally, 
the British have strongly impacted the development of personal law systems in their 
former colonies.59 By traditionally leaving family law matters to religious tribunals, 
the British authorities fostered the understanding that marriage has nothing to do 
with the state.60 For this reason, at least some immigrants coming to the UK today 
are less likely to be overly concerned about what the state has to say on family life.
However, the distance between Muslims and the national legal order which 
made the bottom-up approach possible is also the source of its weaknesses. Not 
only are adherents of Sharia and other systems of religious law less likely to contest 
the state, but are fundamentally not going to be interested in seeking its aid. Indeed, 
Werner Menski observes the rejection of the national legal system by Muslim 
immigrants, a trend which is further encouraged by the prejudice and negativity 
55  This much is clear from the nature of the recent debate on Sharia itself, which was not 
initiated by a Muslim group, as was the case in Canada. Instead, the controversy was 
triggered by the now former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams. It was he who 
was heavily criticised for his suggestion that the existing Sharia tribunals should be more 
“integrated” into the British legal system. The Muslims themselves, however, were drawn in 
only subsequently. (For an analysis of the Archbishop’s views, see Budziszewski, J., Natural 
Law, Democracy, and Shari’a, in Shari’a in the West, New York, Oxford University Press, 
2010, p. 206.)
56  Yilmaz, I., Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States, Aldershot, Ashgate, 
2005, 62. (noting a number of factors that contributed to this attitude: distrust towards secular 
institutions, their perceived lack of legitimacy and avoidance of public embarrassment that 
could occur if family matters would be brought before a court of law)
57  Machado, J. E. M., Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, Roger Williams University 
Law Review, vol. 10/451, 2009, 467.
58  Menski, W., op. cit., p 56.
59  Shah, for example, argues that the efforts of the colonial authorities to recreate Western 
notions of religion in South Asian colonies contributed to the division of the personal 
law systems in line with the religious criterion imposed, causing difficulties. Namely 
“post-colonial states have had to contend with the wide-ranging and problematic task of 
reconnecting official laws to indigenous frameworks, as had been the case in the pre-modern 
era” (Shah, P., Thinking Beyond Religion: Legal Pluralism in Britain’s South Asian Diaspora, 
Asian Law 8 [2006]: 243).
60  Douglas G. et al., Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts, 
Cardiff, Cardiff University, June 2011, p. 18; Shah P., A Reflection on the Shari’a Debate 
in Britain, Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego [Studies of Ecclesiastical Law] 13 (2010), p. 
11. (noting that the fact Muslims are able to arbitrate in family law disputes reinforces the 
impression that the state is in some way disassociated from family and marriage)
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they face in the contemporary British society.61 One example of this occurring is the 
low registration rate of Muslim marriages before the national law.62 This means the 
spouses may face significant difficulty in invoking rights and protections that would 
be provided by the state were the marriage properly registered. It also means that the 
state, as its institutions are not contacted, may lack information on the way Sharia 
works in practice and may therefore have problems with detecting problematic 
practices and issuing adequate measures. This renders some of the most important 
features of the bottom-up system meaningless.
For example, the UK in principle allows religious arbitration in certain limited 
areas (excluding divorce and similar sensitive matters). However, since Muslims 
prefer informal, mediation-like, community-based tribunals to arbitration,63 the 
state faces difficulty in obtaining reliable data to do anything about the possible 
weaknesses of its approach. The ultimate result is a closed-down set of private 
religious tribunals that the state knows very little about, with practically redundant 
and possibly problematic arbitration provisions. At the end of the day, then, the 
British approach remains ineffective when it has to deal with the possible abuses of 
the arrangement it has in place. 
Some attempt to correct the described faults of the British approach by 
making efforts to move it closer to the Canadian one. This is a solution recently 
suggested by the controversial Baroness Cox. Claiming that rights of women are 
being endangered by the legislation currently in place, she tabled a bill aimed at 
extinguishing aspects of the arbitral proceedings that she felt were problematic for 
women’s rights.64 The bill is still in the House of Lords at the time of writing this 
paper and it is not certain whether it will be enacted. 
Nevertheless, the fact that it was introduced provides an interesting opportunity 
to compare the British and Canadian systems. Similarly to the arguments raised in 
61  Menski’s typology of the relationship immigrants establish with the national law encompasses 
four phases. In the first one, the immigrants are unaware of the national law. In the second 
phase, they begin to understand there is something beyond religious norms, and they attempt 
to apply the latter in a way that accounts for the national legal system. In the third stage, 
the Muslim population integrates the secular and religious laws, but does not abandon the 
latter fully. The final stage is one of disillusionment with the national legal system, whereby 
Muslims fall back onto religious norms. They consider themselves rejected by the national 
legal order, so they reject its supremacy in turn, although they might not attempt to challenge 
it. (Menski, W., Law, Religion and Culture in Multicultural Britain, in Law and Religion in 
Multicultural Societies, Copenhagen, Djøf Publishing Copenhagen, 2008, p. 47).
62  Neil Addison, a well-known British scholar, notes that the lack of marriage registration is the 
chief problem for Muslim women, rather than applying Sharia before an informal tribunal. 
(Addison N., Sharia Is Not the Problem Here, <http://www.theguardian.com>, available at: 
http://bit.ly/bA4D0B.)
63  For example, the Sharia Council in Britain does not attempt to establish itself as an arbitration 
tribunal under the 1991 Arbitration Act, but rather describes itself as a mediator. Indeed, in 
Al Midani, the Queen’s Bench found that the organization does not meet the requirements 
of an arbitration tribunal, although the option for reaching that status in the future was not 
foreclosed. (Al Midani & Anor v Al Midani & Ors, [1999] C.L.C. 904 [1999], pg 913).
64  Use of Sharia ‘Courts’ Increasing in UK, The Christian Institute, 18 January 2012, available 
at: http://www.christian.org.uk/news/use-of-sharia-courts-increasing-in-uk/. 
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Canada, Baroness Cox claims that her aim is to protect the rights of women.65 The 
provisions she envisages would achieve this goal are prohibitions that appear to be 
based on scant empirical data.66 Unlike the Ontarian ban, however, the proposed 
bill is not just a blanket ban on religious arbitration. Specifically, in addition to this 
general restriction,67 the Bill pinpoints particular actions, such as pretending one is a 
judge who can make a binding decision.68 In this respect, it is more aggressive than 
the Canadian prohibition, as it singles out potential aspects of religious proceedings 
that may be seen as problematic.69 It also shows a greater attention to detail and an 
effort to seek out matters that may be of highest priority when it comes to human 
rights protection. 
Again, however, it is questionable whether introducing such bans does 
anything in particular. For example, the person presiding over a religious tribunal 
may not find it necessary to claim they have the authority to issue legally binding 
decisions under British law. It is enough for them to assert that their pronouncements 
are in line with Sharia. Since those who turn to religious tribunals could see them 
as more legitimate than the national courts, the fact that they have a decision in 
line with their religious law will in itself create a sense of being bound to act in 
a certain manner. If one wishes to be a good Muslim, the decision of the Sharia 
tribunal will have to be abided by. Whether there is an authority to issue legally 
binding decisions is then beside the point.
Finally, the Bill does contain some laudable provisions, such as the obligation 
of the religious tribunal to inform the parties of their right to turn to the national 
courts and of the need to register marriage before the national law as well in order 
for it to be completely valid.70 However, it is not certain how such solutions would 
work out in practice. The problem in the UK seems to be that Muslims do not trust 
national institutions sufficiently and that the law does not recognise this problem.71 
It is hard to see how this bill could fundamentally change this and why should the 
possibly oppressed members of the Muslim communities be particularly encouraged 
or empowered to step up once it becomes law. 
In summary, the British system is at present characterised by an effort to be 
attentive to the situation on the field. Much like the Canadian system, its efforts 
appear to be directed at providing space for a development and change of religious 
65  Muslim Women’s Advocate Backs Bill to Tackle Sharia, The Christian Institute, July 5, 2011, 
http://www.christian.org.uk/news/muslim-womens-advocate-backs-bill-to-tackle-sharia/. 
66  Malik, N., What Is Lady Cox’s Bill Really About?, <http://www.theguardian.com> , June 20 
2011, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/jun/20/lady-cox-
bill-womens-rights. 
67  Cox, C.,, Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill [HL], 2010, available at: http://
bit.ly/19aW6Lt, sec. 4(2).
68  Ibid., sec. 7(2).
69  Amassing prohibitions in this manner has been recognised as a clear attempt to extinguish 
religious norms in question. (Woodman, G. R., op. cit., p. 32).
70  Cox, C., op. cit., sec. 4.
71  Yilmaz, I., op. cit., p. 80.
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law between individuals. Yet, the lack of proper feedback from them forces the 
government to stumble in the dark. Some seem bent on addressing the problem 
by introducing a more strict form of separation and ensuring that some aspects of 
Sharia do not get out of hand. While such efforts are legitimate, their effectiveness 
is questionable. As in Canada, the UK seems to fail in protecting all the interests 
involved through separation alone. 
4. AccOMMODATIVE EFFEcTS OF SHARIA’S SEPARATION 
FROM THE STATE – TRANSFORMATIVE SPAcE
The most important point of junction between the previously analyzed two 
models of separation between Sharia and the state is that they both accommodate 
Sharia by allowing the individual believers to practice it. In Canada, this process 
is for the most part deprived of any civil effect.72 The UK is by contrast offering 
flexibility and civil effect to those who meet the conditions of the civil law. 
However, much like in Canada, religious law is applied in an informal fashion, 
within tribunals administered by religious communities themselves, which I term 
community-based tribunals. These for the most part do not seek recognition of civil 
effect for their decisions. 
The basic consequence of both models is nonetheless the same: a Muslim 
should be able to submit herself to a religious tribunal of her choosing for the 
matters she picks and, should she wish to stop with the exercise, should at any time 
be free to do so. Indeed, contrary to the image of a Sharia tribunal as a horrible dark 
dungeon where limbs are cut off and stoning is administered, some do navigate the 
waters of religious law and preserve their own interests in the process.73 Separation 
furthers this development by establishing the essentials, the transformative space 
which allows Sharia to be freely applied and changed if so desired by the believers 
themselves. This zone is comprised of three effects produced by separation in 
relation to religious law.74 Firstly, it stops the state from uncritically imposing the 
will of majority onto those who would have Sharia applied (4.1). Secondly, it gives 
the individual believer a choice between human rights (or, more broadly, secular 
law as a whole) and religious law, which includes the possibility for each believer 
to combine both where possible (4.2). Finally, separation prevents the state from 
mixing the religious law with its secular force and thereby petrifying it (4.3). 
72  Amien, W., op. cit., p 403. (noting that some limited venues to introduce religious law into 
civil marriage, such as premarital contracts, remain available)
73  Shah, P., Between God and the Sultana? Legal Pluralism in the British Muslim Diaspora, 
in Shari□a as Discourse: Legal Traditions and Encounter with Europe, Surrey, Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2010, p. 123.
74  Note that these effects have been more or less neatly separated for the purposes of the analysis 
that is to follow, but may in practice be very much interrelated and difficult to uncouple from 
each other.
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4.1. Separation moderates the majoritarian pressure
Religion does not exist in isolation and neither do the norms of its laws. 
They are unavoidably affected by their surroundings. At the simplest level, the 
very existence of a religious rule in a society different to its place of origin may 
cause the norm to adapt. One notable example relevant to the topic of this paper 
is polygamy. It is sometimes referred to as an unacceptable rule that subjugates 
women. However, the new circumstances brought about by the upward movement 
of British Muslim women changed its original meaning, enabling women to use it 
for their own advantage.75 The modification may be surprising, but some change is 
nonetheless to be expected. After all, a religious norm is in such cases a transplant 
and a transplant does not have to work at its destination in the way it did in the 
original environment. 
The effect of the broader society on religious norms is more complex than 
this, however. Sharia’s surroundings in a Western liberal democracy are not static. 
They may actively require religious norms to change and adapt to the demands 
of the majority. As a result, the state may regulate the position of Sharia in a 
particular manner. The pressure that is thereby exerted on religion has already been 
thoroughly examined. Here I only recapitulate the main findings of those studies 
and relate them to Sharia’s position. Most notably, Asim Jusić argues that the state 
regulates non-mainstream religious groups in accordance with their position in the 
social strata. The key factors are their “potential for “disloyalty”” and the distance 
from the mainstream. What is in the mainstream depends on what has been socially 
and legally defined as such, while the distance from it is “perceived and socially 
constructed”.76 Hence, the pressure that emerges is partly a legal construct and 
partly a social entity. Consequently, law alone cannot remove it. On the contrary, 
misguided attempts to do so might only distort its effect. 
For example, even if Sharia would be codified by the state and introduced as 
a fully fledged system of laws, it would still clash with sentiments and interests 
of some citizens. They might be against state enforcement of a religious norm 
generally or might want a different iteration of it applied. They would nevertheless 
be pressured to adapt to the newfound situation. 
Additional difficulties may emerge from this situation. Namely, in addition 
to provisions most common in secular law, such as imperative rules, religious 
75  The structure of the Muslim population in the UK is becoming increasingly complex, with 
women getting more education and better-paid employment options. At the same time, 
there is a shortage of eligible men to marry. Hence, several women may agree to religiously 
marry the same man so as to avoid tying themselves down to a mate incompatible with 
their own goals. (High-flying Muslim Career Women Willing to ‘Share Husbands’ Because 
of a Lack of Suitable Men, MailOnline, March 11, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2113366/Muslim-women-share-husbands-lack-suitable-men.html.)
76  Jusić, A., Non-mainstream Religious Groups: Perspectives from Economics and Social 
Psychology, Doctoral Thesis (S.J.D.), Central European University: Department of Legal 
Studies, available in full at: < http://goya.ceu.hu/record=b1160687~S0 >, 2011, pp. 141–142.
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laws contain recommendations and other, more nuanced norms.77 These are hard 
to properly translate into national law. It is likely that attempting to do so would 
oversimplify religious law on one level and disfigure it for believers on another. 
The approach to personal law systems during the era of colonialism outlines the 
problem and its negative consequences well.78 In short, it is logical to conclude that 
attempting to override separation by introducing religious law does not eradicate 
the pressure emerging from difference. Instead, it only gets moved around and may 
potentially get disfigured. 
Similar criticism could be directed at attempts to befriend particular, more 
moderate Muslim communities and to then use them as conduits for promoting 
government’s policies. This tendency is particularly prominent in the case of the 
United Kingdom,79 while Canada does not seem to advocate such techniques. 
The European Court of Human Rights has, indeed, shown some trepidation when 
state involvement in the structure of religious communities is concerned.80 This is 
understandable. Once a state singles out a particular group or a segment of it, it can 
no longer be considered just a part of the religious scene. 
Specifically, the chosen group is standing on the threshold between two fires, 
the state on the one hand and other religious communities on the other. Its marriage 
with the state may well cost it its authenticity and influence with other believers. On 
the other side, it needs to pay more attention to what it does, so as to avoid falling 
foul of the state. At the end of the day, the religious community may be seen as the 
extended arm of the state that corrupts the traditional values. In a way, it becomes a 
part of the majority’s pressure. Its only difference to the usual pressure is that it has 
a familiar, religious face. 
In this scenario, the threat from the state is increased. Not only may it 
appear to threaten the traditional with majoritarian values that may be perceived 
as blasphemous and immoral, but it may be seen as twisting the holy doctrine to 
trick the righteous. The conflict between the religious and the secular then gets an 
additional dimension, as the state is no longer just the state. It assumes an almost 
mythical character - it becomes a force of darkness that tempts the righteous 
77  Woodman, G. R., op. cit., 34.
78  For example, Emon explains how the French in Algeria simplified the native personal legal 
systems by codifying them, ignoring the richness that followed their usual application by 
the native peoples. Similar arguments are made in the context of the British administration 
of India’s personal laws. (Emon, op. cit., p. 17; Tagari, H., Personal Family Law Systems 
- a Comparative and International Human Rights Analysis, International Journal of Law in 
Context 8, no. 2 [2012]: 237).
79  Morris, R. M., ed., Church and State: Some Reflections on Church Establishment in England, 
London, The Constitution Unit, Department of Political Science - University College London, 
2008, p. 11.
80  Evans, C., Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on Human Rights, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 720. It should be noted that Islam is a far less 
institutionalized religion than Judaism or Christianity. (Rohe, M., op. cit., p. 334.) Attempting 
to establish a hierarchy by privileging some Muslim organisations where there should be only 
pluralism in the eyes of the believers may therefore turn out to be highly problematic.
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believer.81 As the religious path is often considered difficult, going contrary to 
the mundane and the sinful, fighting against heresy of the state becomes a fitting 
challenge for the devout. It is not difficult to move from this point into additional 
problems that are, in the end, caused entirely by the state getting involved into 
religious matters.
Hence, rather than attempting to alter the pressure by force or manipulation, 
the right approach is to moderate it. This is precisely what separation achieves. 
It guarantees religious freedom of individuals and leaves with them the right to 
abandon the practices they disapprove of. In doing so, it prevents the majority 
from imposing their will onto those who want to adhere to religious laws. Of 
course, the majoritarian pressure is still there. As Jusić argues, it can impose two 
basic responses to religious practices it considers unacceptable: distancing and the 
stronger condemnation, or “disloyalty”.82 Some of these may be sanctioned by the 
state. In terms of Sharia, an example of condemnation could be the deprivation 
of civil effect of a Sharia-compliant prenuptial contract or criminalising child 
marriages. Nevertheless, the responses of the majority are not unbounded. They 
are only supported by the state up to a certain limit and according to the rules set 
by the state limited in its power, not by every whim of the majority. Beyond this, 
the believers retain their right to adhere to whatever version of religious law they 
choose. 
Therefore, the state practising separation becomes a bulwark against the 
extremism that would otherwise be much more likely to enter the scene. In this 
manner, it plays a key role in ensuring the transformative space in which religious 
law can operate. Namely, with the pressures of the majority held at bay, secular law 
and the religious law are free to interact without one immediately overwhelming 
the other. Interesting hybrid solutions may be the long-term result. For instance, 
the interaction between the secular law and Sharia in the UK resulted in a form of 
marriage contract useful for both the Muslim communities and the state. It not only 
follows religious requirements but is also tweaked to ensure that the bride remains 
well protected.83 Similar solutions would likely be harder to achieve if the state 
81  Such a temptation is not unique to one sole religion. In Christianity, the Bible warns of false 
Christs, Jesus himself being tempted with worldly riches and power he had to reject. The 
mundane is in certain religions, such as Buddhism or Gnosticism, seen as an illusion that 
needs to be overcome. It is often presented as the opposite of the spiritual, its deception so 
great that it uses spiritual and religious themes to trick the believer. For example, Gnosticism 
teaches that the material world is a prison, ruled by a false deity, and that liberation from 
it through knowledge and understanding is essential to salvation. Having this point in the 
religious teachings could also make conversion to a different religion difficult, as the believer 
needs to take special care in making sure that she is not being tricked. If she is, and she 
succumbs, her immortal soul might be doomed.
82  Jusić, A., op. cit., p. 11.
83  Grillo, R., Cultural Diversity and the Law: Challenge & Accommodation, MMG Working 
Paper - Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity 09-14 (2009), 
available at: http://www.mmg.mpg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/wp/WP_09-14_
Grillo_Cultural-Diversity-and-the-Law.pdf, p. 25.
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was attempting to override separation and give full force to every demand of the 
majority or a particular religious group. 
In sum, Muslim communities may face demands from confronting those who 
are different, including the majority that may have a completely different view on 
religion. As a result, they may feel pressured to change in the face of those who 
do not share their beliefs or may, at the very least, re-examine their convictions. 
Perhaps this is an unavoidable consequence of life in a plural society. Nevertheless, 
separation ensures that this natural pressure is not abused and mutated by the state 
wanting to impose a particular understanding of the “good life” to minorities. 
The end result is that Muslims are exposed to difference. However, it is not 
allowed to overwhelm them as it would be in case of a government that violates 
separation and fully espouses the understanding of a particular religion or the 
democratic majority. By the same token, Muslim communities are not allowed to 
impose themselves onto others. As some have emphasized, the key is in maintaining 
a balance between the two sides, instead of conceptualizing them as opposites that 
necessarily have to cancel one another out.84 Separation then becomes an art of 
maintaining a perpetual creative tension. 
4.2. Separation provides the believer with a choice
In the previous section, I have argued that separation tempers the societal 
pressure applied to Muslims, but does not remove it. Instead, the pressure exists 
parallel to Sharia. In the first place, this provides a reference point. It helps both 
sides face the different and by consequence should assist them in understanding 
their own characteristics better. Whether this chance is taken up appropriately is 
an interesting debate, but will not be tackled in this paper.85 Instead, here I prefer 
to point out a second dimension of Sharia’s coexistence with what I termed the 
majoritarian pressure. Namely, the fact that the two exist next to each other gives 
the believer a choice. On the one hand, the pressure of the different is not just an 
abstract force, as its significant exponents are the secular law in general and human 
84  An-Na’im, A. A., Islam and the Secular State. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008, 
p. 268; Xanthaki, A.. Multiculturalism and Extremism: International Law Perspectives, In 
Religion, Human Rights and International Law, Leiden-Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2007, p. 463.
85  For example, Mancini implies that the learning opportunity coming from facing what is 
different is not being used appropriately. She argues that the headscarf controversies reflect 
a projection of the improperly resolved gender equality issues onto the Muslim population, 
which effectively becomes tagged with the Western “baggage” of inequality. Hence, Muslims 
turn into scapegoats for the faults of Western societies. Similarly, Olivier Roy notes that 
“Islam is a mirror in which the West projects its own identity crisis”. Calo also suggests that 
a part of the problem in understanding the Muslim identity as an opposition to the European 
secular values. (Mancini, S., Patriarchy as the Exclusive Domain of the Other: The Veil 
Controversy, False Projection and Cultural Racism, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 10, no. 2 [2012]: pp. 411–428; Roy, O., Secularism confronts Islam, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2007, p. xiii; Calo, Z. R., op. cit., p. 104).
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rights in particular. Those are, in a sense, the language of the state. Sharia, on the 
other hand, is the language of a religion or, at least, a particular understanding of it.
The language analogy is particularly apt, although not entirely exact.86 
Languages are fully ordered creatures insofar as they are confined to grammar books 
and dictionaries, where multiple meanings of words and the ways to use them can 
be neatly defined. However, once they step out of the boundaries of academia into 
practice, all hell breaks loose as words are liberally used in all kinds of ways, not 
all of them within the strictures of formal rules. In the resulting chaos, individual 
speakers pick and choose. Sometimes mixing several languages is an everyday 
activity. Teenagers, for example, may use foreign words as an act of rebellion. 
Natives might reject any foreign language whatsoever, priding themselves on their 
own traditions. They may also struggle with a foreign language, finding it hard to 
stop “thinking” in their own language and just embrace the logic that organizes the 
words of a foreigner. In all the confusion, linguists may be making efforts to ensure 
that two idioms are not mixed, that the purity is maintained. 
The described situation is similar to the relationship of religion and its laws, 
Sharia in particular, with human rights and, more broadly, secular law. It may be 
easily assumed that, since the two sides are separate, they must also be impossible to 
mix. After all, they have different sources, work in different ways and, plainly, seem 
to be two opposing forces that cannot be brought together no matter how much one 
tries.87 However, this dichotomy, while more applicable to the relationship of the 
government with religions, has been thoroughly debunked on the level of individual 
citizens.88 In real-life situations, Muslims do not just choose between one and the 
other. The two may be mixed. 
Human rights can be used to negotiate a different application of Sharia or, if 
this is not possible, provide a lever to abandon it altogether. Some examples have 
been reported in the literature. In the context of Canada, for example, Fournier refers 
to a case of a woman who invoked norms of the secular legal order to resist her 
family’s demand to adhere to a disadvantageous application of Sharia.89 The case 
reminds of an important point: human beings are not either believers or citizens, but 
are both at the same time. They live their everyday lives and adapt their religious 
identity in the process.
86  Choosing between different languages does not normally cause harm. However, making a 
choice between the secular and religious laws may deprive one of health, property and, in 
extreme circumstances, even life. 
87  There are, however, several interesting similarities between secular law and Sharia. For an 
analysis of the parallels between the two, see van Hoecke, M., Islamic Jurisprudence and 
Western Legal History, in Shari□a as Discourse: Legal Traditions and Encounter with Europe, 
Surrey, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010, pp. 45–55.
88  Bhabha, F., Between Exclusion and Assimilation: Experimentalizing Multiculturalism, 
McGill Law Journal 54 (2009), p. 75; Quraishi, A., What If Sharia Weren’t the Enemy?: 
Rethinking International Women’s Rights Advocacy on Islamic Law, Columbia Journal of 
Gender and Law 22 (2011), after footnote 7.
89  Fournier, P., Calculating Claims: Jewish and Muslim Women Navigating Religion, Economics 
and Law in Canada, International Journal of Law in Context 8, no. 1 [2012], p. 62.
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For instance, a woman wanting to get divorced under Sharia may sacrifice her 
mahr90 and give a divorce herself. She may also reinterpret her own identity and 
simply reduce the importance of her religious marriage in her own mind, staying 
a Muslim without adhering to Sharia’s rules on divorce. She may, finally, perform 
an overhaul of her religious identity, abandoning Islam or religion altogether. In 
making any of the possible choices, she may invoke secular law generally and 
human rights specifically if she finds it necessary.
Of course, the choice argument is far more complex. Separation is providing 
more room for individual’s decisions, but this is not to say the space is always 
usable by all. The community, the family, material conditions in which one lives, 
and, indeed, one’s own understanding of life and choice may restrain the believer. 
In a word, there is a difference between having options and being able to live them 
out. As Martha Nussbaum eloquently puts it, “The person with plenty of food may 
always choose to fast, but there is a great difference between fasting and starving”.91 
She suggests approaching the problem by looking at whether the society promotes 
or hinders particular capabilities of each individual, such as their physical integrity 
or emotions. 
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to analyse this suggestion in 
full detail, as my primary goal here is to look at what separation in itself does to 
religious law. It is therefore sufficient to note that separation in itself does not ensure 
that a choice can be exercised; its reach is more modest. It creates a framework and 
provides a choice. In doing so, it may even further certain, but not all “capabilities” 
as Nussbaum uses the term.92 For example, having a state that is separate from 
religious law does not automatically improve women’s economic status to the point 
where they can make decisions with full autonomy. However, it is easier to develop 
one’s own thoughts about religious law if there is a feasible alternative to it and it 
may consequently be easier to change one’s religious belonging if this is desired. 
Therefore, separation is friendlier to particular capabilities, such as individual’s 
thinking, feeling and affiliation. 
By contrast, in jurisdictions where separation is not exercised, even these 
fundamental capabilities may be curtailed. For example, in Israel, one does not have 
90  In this paper, I use the terms dower, dowry and mahr as synonyms, all denoting the sum of 
money or other valuables the woman receives in line with her marriage-related rights under 
Sharia. I do not refer to a similar payment that may be made by the wife or her family to 
the husband, which is traditional in some cultures. Note that there is a lack of consensus in 
the literature over the way the payment of the husband to his wife under Sharia is called. 
Some variations include maher or mahar. I have used mahr as it seems to be most prevalent 
alternative. 
91  Nussbaum, M. C., Women and Human Development, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p. 87.
92  On page 5 of her Women and Human Development, she defines capabilities as “what people 
are actually able to do and to be - in a way informed by an intuitive idea of a life that is 
worthy of the dignity of the human being”. For a list of capabilities identified by Nussbaum, 
see ibid., 78. Those include, among others: bodily health and integrity, emotions and thoughts, 
practical reason.
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a real choice between a religious marriage and a secular marriage. If the couple 
would like a secular marriage, they have to leave the country to get it and then 
have it recognised under the Israeli law.93 Consequently, the very exercise of one’s 
fundamental freedoms is made harder if not impossible to expect.94 Separation, 
while it cannot in itself ensure all the material conditions one needs to be 
autonomous in religious matters, certainly creates a more conducive environment 
for ones identity. At the very least, it furthers certain capabilities that the fusion of 
the state and religious law endangers. 
Therefore, separation, besides ensuring that the majority’s pressure is 
moderated by limiting the state, secures an element of choice for the believer. It by 
no means represents a complete solution, but it does promise more freedom than is 
the case in a jurisdiction where separation is not exercised. The last effect by which 
separation contributes to an environment conducive to the change in Sharia follows 
from the choice argument. Namely, by allowing the believer to take control over the 
way religious law is interpreted and applied, separation avoids its petrification. 
4.3 Separation prevents Sharia’s petrification
The third effect of separation is attached to the previous one. If religious law 
is left to the believer and her choice, it may as a corollary be freer to develop and 
change. By contrast, were religious law integrated with the state, it would be more 
or less stunted in its development. This follows from the nature of the state and law 
themselves. Namely, it has been pointed out that contemporary states, at least in the 
circle of Western liberal democracies, aim to make their laws as predictable and 
stable as possible. Law remains a traditional system, its response to external changes 
being often delayed and characterised by various formalisms and procedural 
requirements that have to be met.95 Historical experience at the times of British 
colonial conquest demonstrates that these characteristics were detrimental for 
development of religious law. By codifying its provisions, the British froze certain 
aspects of Sharia in time.96 In a word, their changes were made more difficult as the 
characteristics of the national legal order encompassed them as well. Religious law 
then becomes more petrified. 
93  I am grateful to Professor Brett Scharffs for bringing this point to my attention.
94  In Israel, the close state relationship with religions produces other difficulties not directly 
relevant for this paper. For instance, Failinger reports on the so-called “clothes inspection 
movement”. Orthodox Jewish women are now expected to wear clothes that closely follow 
the standards set by a group of ultra-conservative women. Not doing so results in abuse 
against the offender. (Failinger, M. A., Finding a Voice of Challenge: The State Responds 
to Religious Women and Their Communities, Southern California Review of Law & Social 
Science 21 (2012), p. 154) As a result, certain fundamental capabilities may be constrained, 
such as bodily integrity and affiliation.
95  Nikola Visković, Teorija Države i Prava [Theory of State and Law], Zagreb, Birotehnka, 
2001, p. 152.
96  An-Na’im, A. A., op. cit., p. 289.
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Some groups may find such a development particularly helpful. If a religious 
norm can move from being a purely religious mandate into a practice sanctioned 
by the state, it is possible to entrench specific forms of religious adjudication or 
religious norms. In this manner, a religious rule may be shielded from the space 
separation leaves for a transformation of religious law. Simply put, a traditional 
practice may become more immune to the changes in practice. For instance, 
the Ismaili community, which has in the UK emphasized its “enthusiasm” 
for maintaining dispute resolution in their own groups,97 may feel that a state 
recognition of those mechanisms would put them on a firmer ground. As a result 
of the stronger grounding, it may be harder to argue that religious adjudication is 
a matter of personal choice and that individual believers have a right to interpret 
Sharia as they see fit. Consequently, voluntary use of religious law would not 
really be placed on a firmer ground, as some have claimed.98 While religious law 
itself would be better grounded, there is a palpable risk that its use would be less 
voluntary. In such scenarios, the state actually goes beyond the permissible granting 
of civil effect to religious norms, violating separation.
The risk depends on the way the state chooses to bond with religious law. In 
this regard, Woodman helpfully differentiates between institutional and normative 
recognition of religious norms.99 Simply put, institutional recognition would involve 
granting religious institutions the jurisdiction to decide on particular disputes. 
Establishing a governmental religious court would be the most extreme example. 
One consequence of its existence is a certain petrification of religious law. Namely, 
a particular strand of religious law may be endorsed or empowered as a result of 
institutional recognition since the understanding of a specific community, rather 
than individuals, may come to the forefront. Interpretations of individual believers 
may then be discarded as unauthentic, making change of religious law harder in 
practice. Naturally, this can happen even with informal tribunals led by religious 
communities and the pressure they exert by themselves, but having the state as the 
sponsor of religious bodies complicates matters further. It closes the gap between 
the religious and the secular and, with it, the manoeuvring space for individuals.
The second form of recognition, normative, may bring about a similar risk. In 
these cases, the secular law absorbs certain religious norms, making them the law of 
the land. Naturally, much depends on which norms are adopted and in what manner. 
For instance, allowing Muslim marriages to be registered with civil effect should be 
uncontroversial.100 Providing that Muslim women may inherit only a half of what is 
inheritable by men, however, is a different matter altogether. Once such recognition 
97  Jivraj V. Hashwani, [2010] EWCA Civ 712 (2011), para 14.
98  Witte Jr., J., and Nichols, J. A., op. cit., p. 127.
99  Woodman, G., op. cit., p. 33.
100  That is, of course, as long as the requirements for granting such civil effect are not different 
than those applied to all civil marriages. For example, allowing minors to get married in 
a way that is sanctioned by Sharia would be problematic, as well as imposing more strict 
requirements for civil effect of Muslim marriages than is the case with secular marriages or 
marriages entered into by members of other religions.
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occurs, what the individual believer may feel about religious law and its place in her 
existence becomes less relevant. In such cases, invoking ones human rights may be 
less effective, as the religious is interlaced with the secular. 
Examples of this problem cannot be observed in any of the jurisdictions studied 
thus far. However, some other countries, such as Egypt or Iraq, do adopt Sharia 
as a principal source of state law, commingling it with what would otherwise be 
understood as secular law. A case in point is the Egyptian constitutional declaration, 
which in its latest iteration perpetuates the rule established by earlier constitutional 
documents, entrenching “the principles of Islamic Sharia which include its 
overall evidences and jurisprudence rules and established sources in the 
Sunni canons” as “the main source of legislation”.101 In such cases, the secular 
law is not as such distinct from religious law, leaving less if any room for individual 
believers to manifest their own understanding of religious norms. 
For example, El Menyawi points out that, in Egypt, the khul divorce, given by 
women, traditionally required the consent of the husband in order to be effective. In 
addition, as is usually the case with khul, the women who give it have to renounce 
their dowry. After a reform, the consent requirement was removed. Needles to say, 
this stirred up quite a controversy.102 It also did not change the fact that, in giving 
the khul, women inevitably had to give up their mahr, endangering their financial 
stability. 
This example demonstrates that, because Sharia is in effect state law, the 
changes that had to be made to it were more limited and painstaking.103 It is logical 
to assume that the difficulties would be reduced were each individual believer 
the one to decide whether khul should require consent or surrendering the mahr, 
without the decision being interfered with by the state. In cases where this intrusion 
does occur, it seems that changing religious law becomes an extensive, controversial 
project that is more likely to involve the whole state. 
In summary, separation reduces the difficulties that surround the change of 
religious law by keeping the state out of it. The administration of Sharia is left to 
believers, which makes them freer to make decisions as to the way religious norms 
should be interpreted. Naturally, in terms of Sharia, this is not without difficulty, 
but the possibility is there. Attempts to officially introduce religious law could be 
seen as efforts towards circumventing such an option and immunising Sharia from 
change. They should therefore be approached with caution, so that the pressure 
101  Constitutional Declaration of Egypt, Available at < http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/
Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=2666>, 2013, art. 1.
102  El Menyawi, H., The Gift of Ambiguity: Strategising Beyond the Either/or of Secularism and 
Religion in Islamic Divorce Law, in Islam, Law and Identity, Oxford, Routledge, 2012, p. 
105.
103  In making this claim, I also acknowledge that a significant factor contributing to the 
difficulties were the traditions established in the Egyptian society. Those were for sure likely 
to exert an additional pressure against a change. (For an argument on how tradition may 
affect a change in law, see Jusić, A., op. cit., p. 84.)
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generated by the surrounding society and the choice left to Muslims in how to 
address it are not unduly interfered with. 
5. ADDRESSING THE LIMITS OF SEPARATION WITH REGARD 
TO THE TRANSFORMATIVE SPAcE
The discussion thus far demonstrated that the narrative describing separation as 
an obstacle to accommodation is unfounded, particularly when it comes to religious 
law, especially Sharia. Rather than a hurdle to be overcome, separation here plays 
a key role in the proper accommodation of religious difference; it is a vital base 
for constructing a truly plural society. It obligates the powers that be to leave more 
room for a dialogue within the civil society and in this manner allows for creative 
solutions to emerge, with due respect both to the freedom of individuals and the 
fundamental values of the legal system and society itself. In order to achieve this, 
separation between the state and the religious law maintains a conflict of opposites, 
but in itself normally does not force the encounter towards a particular resolution.
Nonetheless, the foregoing discussion also revealed a less than idealistic face 
of separation. While it provides the foundation for changes in religious identities 
of individuals, it does not guarantee that this groundwork will be of use to them. 
While it is a foundation for treating claims to recognise Sharia appropriately, it does 
not replace the walls or the roof of the project. This is most evident with the choice 
argument presented above. The effects of separation are therefore limited. 
That separation is limited in this case is perhaps unsurprising. The models 
of separating Sharia from the state that are currently in place are essentially based 
in the same logic which shaped the separation of religion from the state generally, 
namely that religion ought to be a private affair in the sense that individuals should 
decide on their own religious belonging and ideas by themselves. This logic, 
however, carries in itself the seed of its own destruction. By vesting individuals 
with the space to express their religious sensitivities and join with others to do so, 
separation sets the stage and opens up room for development of new religious ideas 
which then attract adherents. Once they become entrenched enough, these teachings 
may gain a life of their own, sometimes with large and well organised groups 
disseminating them. Over time, they may become less flexible and more dogmatic. 
What individuals feel may be less relevant. How well they adhere to the accepted 
creed may be all that matters.
In time, therefore, a religious community and the understanding of religious 
doctrine it advocates are made stronger. What the group understands to be the true 
way trumps individual interpretations, which pale in comparison to the force of the 
shared creed. This collective understanding interjects itself between the state and 
the citizen, calling to obedience all those who wish to be saved. The state normally 
should not interfere as it is restricted by separation and religious freedom. Perversely, 
however, it may actually violate separation, not in order to support anyone’s rights 
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per se, but because it is tempted by well established religions. The power the latter 
hold within the most intimate recesses of the believer’s identity, well beyond the 
reach of the secular law, may for the government represent the proverbial forbidden 
fruit.104 The state may thus find itself bonding with the traditional and well-
established religious thought, further amplifying its reach and reducing the impact 
of less prominent strands of understanding, particularly individual initiatives to 
make a difference in the field of religion.105 It may also choose to assault religion, 
striving to eradicate its influence and diminishing religious freedom in the process.
Even if the state does not interfere in the way described above and upholds 
separation instead, an individual choice may be made more difficult by the powerful 
influence exerted by the religious group. This may hold particularly true for tightly 
knit immigrant communities, offering the most familiar environment for those who 
still feel that the West is alien and even fallen from the right way. Rejection from 
the only known sanctuary may leave the believer deprived of what she knows as 
stable and true, possibly leaving her economically disadvantaged and vulnerable in 
the process as well. In order to avoid becoming a pariah in what is perceived to 
be an unforgiving world, the believer may thus forego the possibilities opened by 
separation or may be forced to do so by those whom she holds dear.  
Against this background, it is clear why some scholars have been arguing that 
the burden individual believer suffers must be alleviated and that the state should 
introduce a variety of measures to make the choice individuals make more feasible, 
mending the weaknesses of separation. However, these authors tend to deal with 
separation as something that is to be overcome and do not factor its transformative 
space into the equation.106 Consequently, their suggestions may twist the zone 
104  It has been noted that the state may perceive religion as a retort in which spiritual force can 
be added to the secular power. (Hirschl, R., Constitutional Theocracy, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2010, p. 13) By engaging in this dangerous ritual, however, religion may 
end up drained of its spiritual lifeblood. Protecting its remaining spiritual autonomy may 
then require special arrangements with the state. One example coming from the UK is the 
exemption added to the 1998 Human Rights Act. It is supposed to ensure that the established 
Church of England is not forced to act contrary to its teachings. This is possible in theory 
since the Church is considered a public authority by law, meaning that its work requires it to 
adhere to the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights. A particular concern 
has been the possibility that the state forces the Church to wed same-sex couples. (Feldman, 
D., ed., English Public Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 486).
105  As the recent US controversy over the religious symbolism found in a city crest demonstrates, 
sometimes the traditional thought becomes so well entrenched that it is impossible to claim 
it is not normal for it to be expressed publicly and in a way which creates a bond with the 
state. (Weber, K., Atheists order Florida court to remove 131-year-old city seal due to cross 
symbol: Legal group says court decision would be “subjective”, <global.christianpost.com>, 
27 September 2013, available at: http://global.christianpost.com/news/atheists-order-florida-
city-to-remove-131-year-old-city-seal-due-to-cross-symbol-legal-group-says-court-decision-
would-be-subjective-105398/)
106  For example, Shachar identifies separation of Sharia and the state with “relegating 
these religious traditions to the margins, labeled as unofficial, exotic or even dangerous 
(unrecognized) law”. (Shachar, Privatizing..., cit., p. 593).
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generated by separation and make harder a change in accordance with the will of 
individual believers. Some schemes are more risky than others, however, and it is 
the task of this part of the paper to single them out. In this manner, we may better 
understand how to expand the agency of individual believers to the fullest.
To start with, all suggested safeguards discussed below can be arranged along 
a spectrum, in accordance with their mode of functioning. On the one side are those 
measures that seek to empower individual believers to make their own choices 
when it comes to Sharia. In other words, these safeguards boost the capabilities of 
each citizen to define their identity autonomously. The state here only provides the 
tools for citizens to use, but does not actively involve itself in their application.107 
On the other side of the scale are those safeguards that are not really safeguards in 
the proper sense of the word, but channels through which the state to some extent 
dictates the developments in the transformative space. The use of such methods 
can be confused with the first group as it may sometimes appear that they work in 
the same way. However, they actually do not strengthen the individual, but seek 
to direct the conflict towards a particular solution, thereby diminishing the creative 
role of individuals in constructing their own identity. 
An illustrative example of a suggestion leaning strongly towards the latter end 
of the spectrum may be found in “Multicultural Jurisdictions”, the seminal work 
of Ayalet Shachar. In it, she argues against the traditional divides between public 
and private, religious and secular, advocating instead for a model of “transformative 
accommodation”.108 Rightfully pointing out that human beings may be both citizens 
and believers, she suggests that different matters, such as marriage, be divided along 
the so-called sub-matter lines, so that they are both under the jurisdiction of the state 
and the religious community. The believer can then move between the two.109 This 
is made possible by the so-called “reversal points”, junctures at which the believer 
may safely opt out of religious law and for secular law and vice versa, on the basis 
of her interest. 
While Shachar’s argument is undoubtedly convincing, there are several 
weaknesses worth addressing from the viewpoint of the transformative space. 
As Maleiha Malik notes, by employing the concept of “reversal points”, Shachar 
assumes that it will be possible to pinpoint concrete spots where the believer may 
shift between one jurisdiction and the other. This is not necessarily the case. There 
might be considerable controversy over the content and the workings of religious 
law within a community, let alone between different groups. Furthermore, there 
may be issues over whether the believer is able to phase out religious law at any 
107 I depart here from Ayalet Shachar, who claims that these measures are a form of state 
oversight, ex ante supervision. (ibid., 600).
108  Shachar, A.. Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 242.
109  For a detailed application of her argument in the context of religious arbitration in Canada 
and religious adjudication more broadly, see Shachar, A., Religion..., cit.; Shachar, A., 
State..., cit.
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point and matters related to the way the group usually operates. The state would 
then have to make a particular assumption about the way the group it is interacting 
with functions and the way religious law is applied.110 It is questionable whether this 
state-developed notion would rise to the challenge and be favourably reflected in a 
negotiation process or its results. 
Even more importantly for this paper, it is dubious whether engaging in 
such a project would be compatible with separation in the long run. After all, the 
state would inevitably have to choose a number of representative organisations 
to negotiate with. Given that Sharia is particularly pluralistic,111 there is no 
guarantee that the communities chosen would be representative (and, indeed, 
that the agents of the chosen communities would be representative). As a result, 
the regime of transformative accommodation might actually favour only some, 
possibly entrenched understandings of religious law, while all others would be in an 
unprivileged position. 
The transformative space would to some extent be warped on at least 
two counts. Firstly, particular groups are favoured over others, along with 
their understanding of religious law, meaning that the moderating effect of the 
transformative space becomes split. Two layers of religious law application are 
fostered. One is the negotiated, public stratum, which conforms to the conditions 
determined by the state in its interaction with religious communities. Underneath it 
lays the obfuscated, hidden area where religious law may be applied differently. 
The second danger for transformative space lies in establishing reversal 
points. In order for them to exist, religious law would have to be settled to some 
extent. The state in the process of negotiation would have to direct the contents of 
religious law in a particular way to make this possible. Differences over conflicting 
alternatives may have to be pre-emptively resolved. Individual believers would 
then be constrained in their ability to develop different interpretations of religious 
law. This makes the transformative accommodation approach a particularly risky 
venture.
The other side of the spectrum offers more moderate and acceptable 
suggestions. These aim at slightly tilting the balance between the religious 
community and its individual members in favour of the latter. One particularly 
popular recommendation is to introduce religious arbitration with special safeguards, 
similarly to what has been advocated by Marion Boyd in her report to the Ontarian 
government.112 The most powerful argument for safeguarded arbitration is that it 
reduces the cost individual believers may face when wanting to opt out of informal, 
community-based tribunals administered by their communities. In plain terms, it is 
very probable that they would have an easier time choosing a religious arbitration 
110  Malik, M., Minority Legal Orders in the UK, London, British Academy: Policy Centre, 2012, 
p. 38.
111  Shahar, I., Legal Pluralism and the Study of Shari□a Courts, Islamic Law and Society 15 
(2008), p. 117.
112  See supra, p. 9.
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tribunal than a secular, national court.113 For one, they would not be required to 
sacrifice the application of religious law, which respects their desire to conform to 
religious mandates. Secondly, the religious communities to which they belong may 
for the same reason provide less resistance to the believer seeking assistance beyond 
the flock. 
 Naturally, there may be some concerns related to the effectiveness of 
introducing religious arbitration generally. As the British example shows us, the 
mere existence of official channels through which a claim to apply religious law 
may be directed does not mean that they will be used. However, this is not say that 
they would never be employed in any circumstances whatsoever, nor is the degree 
to which this is done a problem for separation itself. The state may still attempt to 
introduce religious arbitration with a network of supportive measures. 
A more pressing concern from the transformative space perspective stems 
from the combined, centaur-like nature of safeguarded religious arbitration. 
Namely, because of its general features, arbitration should normally fall into the 
end of the spectrum supporting individual initiative. It is basically a tool by which 
the parties to a dispute may ensure the legally binding force of their accord outside 
the framework of the national judiciary.114 Therefore, arbitration by its very nature 
corresponds to the features of the first category. However, religious arbitration need 
not remain within its constraints. Depending on the supporting measures added to 
it, arbitration may move closer to the other extreme of the spectrum and may as 
such be used by the state to ensure a greater impact over the developments in the 
transformative space. 
Generally speaking, two suggestions are made as to protective measures 
that ought to be introduced along with religious arbitration, neatly summed up 
by Ayalet Shachar. One is really a group of preconditions for civil validity of the 
decisions rendered by the tribunal. Examples include education of arbitrators in 
matters of secular law (particularly its fundamental values), obligation of arbitrators 
to maintain a case file, obligatory legal counselling for those who intend to avail 
themselves of religious law. The other proposal is that some form of oversight is 
established over religious arbitration tribunals, with a system of mandatory judicial 
review being a concrete suggestion.115 Problematically, neither measure factors in 
the transformative space, which may lead the safeguarded arbitration project to 
knotty results.
Thankfully, the first suggestion or, rather, a group of suggestions, is more 
acceptable. Their main point is to encourage religious communities to respect 
the rights of individual members and avoid extremes in applying religious law 
in exchange for civil effect of their rulings. This, posits Witte, would result in a 
growing confidence in religious adjudication and a reduction of problems with 
113  Ahmed, F., and Luk, S., op. cit., 424–445.
114  Triva, S., and Uzelac, A., Hrvatsko arbitražno pravo [Croatian arbitration law], Zagreb, 
Narodne novine, 2007, p. XXIII.
115  Shachar, A., Religion..., cit., p. 76.
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enforcing its rulings.116 As a result, the stigma usually following Muslims and 
Sharia would be somewhat diminished. I am inclined to agree with this suggestion. 
In terms of separation, of course, it would be essential for the government to offer 
the incentivizing measures to all communities and potential arbitrators on an equal 
basis. In particular, no one should be singled out for adherence to a particular strand 
of Sharia. 
It is the second suggestion that is more problematic. While not in itself 
contrary to separation, establishing a mandatory review process for arbitration 
conducted under Sharia does cause some tension in its transformative space. To 
begin with, mandatory review can be established as long as the courts are applying 
clear standards on recognition of religious law, as outlined in the first part of this 
paper. Still, one cannot escape the fact that by hanging the sword of the state over 
religious tribunals, a permanent bond is established between the secular and the 
religious. National courts become de facto courts of second instance for religious 
tribunals. If the state is not prepared for the continuous interface with the religious, 
its judiciary may end up deciding issues of religious doctrine, bringing about the 
creation of governmental religious courts117 and diminishing both the transformative 
space and separation as its source. This is particularly likely if the societal prejudice 
towards Muslims seeps into the court’s reasoning.118 Thus, for mandatory review to 
be completely functional, Muslims would first need to be better integrated in society 
at large. However, if this stage is reached, one wonders whether mandatory review 
would be needed in the first place.
Assuming that the permanent bond between the secular and the religious is not 
an issue, the parties to a religious arbitration are still forced to have each and every 
decision of the arbitration tribunal reviewed by the national court. This is a particular 
problem if it is only Sharia tribunals that are included in the scheme. Especially in 
a jurisdiction such as Canada, which prides itself on multiculturalism and equality, 
it may well be unacceptable to place only one group under a particularly protective 
arrangement as if they were barbarians requiring special supervision. 
116  Witte Jr., J., The Future of Muslim Family Law in Western Democracies, in Shari’a in the 
West, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 290.
117  Generally speaking, Hofri-Winogradow differentiates three ways of establishing such 
institutional arrangements. Firstly, religious experts can be hired to adjudicate cases of 
religious law in secular courts (which, from that point onward would obviously no longer 
be purely secular). Secondly, judges can be educated in matters of religious law. Finally, a 
separate branch of religious courts could be organised under the auspices of the judiciary. 
(Hofri-Winogradow, A. S., A Plurality of Discontent: Legal Pluralism, Religious Adjudication 
and the State, Journal of Law and Religion XXVI, no. 1 (February 2010), p. 104.) However, 
neither option requires that the government forms new institutions to serve as religious 
courts. The secular power might just confer jurisdiction to the existing bodies of religious 
communities or make necessary changes to secular courts. This change can also be factual, 
when the court decides on matters of religious doctrine it is a governmental religious court, 
even if it exercises this role only in one concrete case.
118  See supra, footnote 23.
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Indeed, it has been noted that the seemingly monolithic Canadian ban on civil 
effect of religious family law arbitration is vulnerable on Charter grounds precisely 
for the attempts to draw boundaries on the basis of a religious criterion. Specifically, 
as long as the proceedings are conducted according to “law of Ontario or of another 
Canadian jurisdiction” the decision made by the tribunal will have binding effect.119 
A prohibition specified in this manner may be vulnerable as it limits religious 
freedom in allowing only secular laws to be applied to arbitration. Consequently, 
as some have argued, fundamentalists could demonstrate that such a selective 
restriction was made in consideration of majoritarian religious beliefs, which 
are reflected in secular laws, and not because there is an actual risk of abuse.120 
Therefore, in the Canadian context, a complete ban on the use of arbitration in 
family matters, as was done in Quebec, appears to be a clearer solution. Toying 
with singling out only certain forms of adjudication or particular groups is a more 
uncertain exercise. 
Additionally, singling out only Sharia adjudication is problematic for implying 
that Sharia is for some reason more dangerous when compared to other religious 
laws, such as Halacha or Canon Law. This in itself is a mistaken idea incompatible 
with objectively separating religious law from the state.121 For instance, both Canada 
and the UK struggled with the abuse of marriage provisions under the Jewish law, 
allowing the husband to deprive his wife of the possibility to remarry.122 Not even 
Canon Law is free from worrying abuses.123 Indeed, given that religious laws were 
sometimes set in stone many centuries ago, their rules on procedure are an eyebrow-
raising read even where their substantive provisions are unobjectionable.124 Hence, 
119  Arbitration Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 17, available at: http://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-
1991-c-17/latest/so-1991-c-17.html, art. 1.
120  Baines, B., Equality’s Nemesis? - Queen’s University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
07-05, Journal of Law and Equality 5, no. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 72; Gaudreault-DesBiens, 
J., Constitutional Values, Faith-Based Arbitration, and the Limits of Private Justice in a 
Multicultural Society, National Journal of Constitutional Law 19 (2005), p. 175 (arguing 
against the vulnerability of the ban to a Charter attack).
121  See supra, pp. 5-7.
122  According to Halacha, the husband may divorce his wife without fully “releasing” her from 
the bonds of marriage. This is achieved by depriving his spouse of the so-called get. Without 
it, she may not remarry under Jewish law and any children she may have are considered 
illegitimate. She is then an agunah, or chained wife. Her former husband, by contrast, 
can religiously remarry and have children without anything chaining him to his former 
companion. For more information on the more innovative uses of get in Canada and the 
UK, see Fournier, P., Calculating..., cit., p. 52; Stephen Jones, Negotiating Islam. Dialogues 
Between Liberalism and Islamic Theologies in 21st Century Britain [Doctoral Thesis (PhD), 
Goldsmiths, University of London. [Thesis]: Goldsmiths Research Online, available in full at 
<http://eprints.gold.ac.uk/6494/>, 2010, p. 163.
123  Pellegrini v. Italy (app. no. 30882/96) (2001) (the Italian court affirmed the decision of the 
Roman Rota although the applicant was deprived of her fundamental procedural rights whilst 
undergoing divorce proceedings under Canon Law).
124  Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating 
Conflicting Legal Orders, New York University Law Review 86, no. 5 (November 2011): p. 
1241.
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in order to properly and impartially shield the core of the national legal order as 
is required by separation, the state would have to establish mandatory review for 
all kinds of religious laws. Even if the national judiciary was at the height of its 
impartiality and professionalism, the variety of cases that could by consequence 
be directed its way may push its endurance to the maximum and thereby make the 
transformative space more unstable, possibly endangering separation as well. 
In sum, religious arbitration may be allowed and some kinds of supportive 
measures may be granted to facilitate its use. The British case vividly demonstrates 
that this is perfectly compatible with separation. However, introducing certain 
safeguards is harder to square with separation or its transformative space. Moreover, 
particular suggestions that aim at overcoming the limitations to separation, such as 
the transformative accommodation model, may be completely unacceptable. 
In principle, therefore, the measures that are going to be most compatible with 
the integrity of the transformative space are those that seek to boost the agency of 
individual citizens without giving the state the opportunity to direct the result of its 
exercise. Those intending to introduce some form of support for those intending to 
navigate the transformative space of separation should therefore be mindful of this 
principle. If ignored, the measures introduced by the state may end up achieving a 
result opposite of what was intended and may warp the pluralism and freedom in a 
society instead of furthering them.
6. cONcLUSION
In contrast to the simplified “public vs. private”, “religious vs. secular”, 
“accommodation vs. separation” scenarios, the “separation as accommodation” 
argument reveals a different face of contemporary responses to religious law in 
the West, particularly Sharia. Instead of being an effort to aggressively suppress 
the insufficiently traditional, separation may be seen as a vital basis for freedom 
and change. Both the seemingly more aggressive top-down model and the more 
permissive bottom-up approach let us reach this very same conclusion. Both 
of them can be observed as sources of the “transformative space”, empowering 
individual believers to make their own choices as to their religious belief, practice 
and belonging. 
Nonetheless, the analysis developed in this paper also reveals significant gaps 
in the transformative space projected by separation. Separation in itself does not 
guarantee that individuals will be able to resist the pressures of their communities, 
which may in some cases result in catastrophic consequences. It is therefore 
understandable that some suggest measures aimed at assisting individuals to 
exercise their rights and avoid being pigeonholed as either dispossessed believers 
or secularized citizens. However, these measures should take into account the 
transformative space and separation itself. If they do not, the price paid for support 
to individuals may be too high as the very grounds for a plural society shifts and 
tumbles, causing additional cracks in the fabric of society. 
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Summary
SEPARATION OF SHARIA FROM THE STATE AS 
ACCOMMODATION – EFFECTS AND LIMITS
Citizens of contemporary constitutional democracies adhering to particular 
religions may submit themselves to laws administered by their religious 
communities insofar as they remain within limits outlined by the national legal 
order. In this paper I analyse this usual response to religious norms against the 
background of the growing presence of Sharia law in Canada and the United 
Kingdom. In particular, I argue that it creates the “transformative space”, allowing 
believers to determine by themselves the extent and the way in which religious law 
will apply to their lives. This space, however, remains riddled with limitations that 
have already been discussed in the existing literature. However, the authors that 
dealt with the problem thus far tended to overlook the nature of the transformative 
space as the groundwork of difference. Instead, they conceptualised it as a barrier 
towards diversity. I look at how this oversight might cause additional problems for 
the always tense religion-state relationship. 
Key words: religious freedom, Sharia, the secular state.
Zusammenfassung
DIE TRENNUNG DES SHARIATSRECHTES VOM STAAT 
ALS QUELLE FÜR DEN RAUM DER VERÄNDERLICHKEIT: 
AUSWIRKUNGEN UND EINSCHRÄNKUNGEN
In modernen verfassten Demokratien ist die Anwendung des Religionsrechtes 
bis zu einem gewissen Grad dem Gläubigen überlassen und der Staat wird sich darin 
meistens nicht einmischen. In dieser Arbeit analysiert der Autor diese gewöhnliche 
Antwort auf Religionsnormen im Kontext der wachsenden Anwesenheit des 
Shariatsrechtes in Kanada und im Vereinigten Königreich. Es wird festgestellt, dass 
diese Antwort den einzelnen Gläubigen die Möglichkeit gibt, selbst zu bestimmen, 
wie und bis zu welchem Grad das Religionsrecht auf sie angewandt wird. Das 
nennt man den Raum der Veränderlichkeit. Viele Autoren weisen schon auf seine 
Einschränkungen hin. Insbesondere wird das Problem der übertriebenen Belastung 
des Gläubigen durch unerbittliche religiöse Tradition betont. Es wird angemerkt, 
dass man auf der Suche nach richtigen Lösungen für diese und andere Probleme 
bedenken muss, dass die Trennung von Staat und Religionsrecht und der daraus 
hervorgegangene Raum der Veränderlichkeit kein Hindernis für Verschiedenheiten 
sondern deren Grundlage sind. Die Vernachlässigung dieser Tatsache kann zu 
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zusätzlichen Schwierigkeiten im immer gespannten Verhältnis zwischen Gewalt und 
Religion führen. 
Schlüsselwörter: religiöse Freiheiten, Shariatsrecht, säkularer Staat.
Riassunto
LA SEPARAZIONE DEL DIRITTO ISLAMICO DALLO STATO 
QUALE FONDAMENTO DI UNO SPAZIO DI VARIABILITÀ: 
EFFETTI E CONFINI
Nelle democrazie costituzionali contemporanee l’applicazione del diritto 
religioso è demandata entro certi confini ai singoli fedeli e lo Stato normalmente 
non vi s’intromette.
Nel presente contributo l’autore analizza detto usuale rimando alle regole 
religiose alla luce della crescente presenza del diritto islamico in Canada e nel 
Regno Unito. Si constata che lo stesso demanda ai singoli fedeli la possibilità di 
definire autonomamente le modalità e la misura in cui il diritto religioso verrà 
applicato nei loro confronti. Un tanto viene definito spazio di variabilità e sui suoi 
limiti si sono già espressi numerosi autori. In particolare modo si pone in rilievo il 
problema dell’eccessiva esposizione dei singoli all’inflessibile tradizione religiosa. 
Evidenziamo che nella ricerca di soluzioni valide atte a risolvere questi o altri 
problemi vi è la necessità di tenere a mente che la separazione tra Stato e diritto 
religioso, come pure lo spazio di variabilità che di qui deriva, non rappresentano 
un ostacolo alla diversità, bensì il loro basamento. Trascurare detta circostanza può 
condurre ad ulteriori difficoltà nel sempre teso rapporto tra potere di governo e 
religione. 
Parole chiave: libertà religiose, diritto islamico, stato secolare.
